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DENYING SPECIAL EDUCATION IN ADULT
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: A BRIEF CRITIQUE
OF TUNSTALL V. BERGESON
Thomas A. Mayes*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1998, the State of Washington passed a statute that
effectively limited public education in adult correctional
facilities. 1 Under this statute, individuals under eighteen who
are confined in Washington adult correctional facilities are still
entitled to educational services. However, all other inmates,
even those with disabilities, are no longer entitled to
educational services. 2 Following this statute's enactment,
Washington State inmates filed a class action against the
State, attacking the validity of the statute on multiple grounds.
In the resulting case, Tunstall v. Bergeson,3 a divided
Washington Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute
on all contested grounds.
The state Supreme Court's disposition of the case subjected
it to varying degrees of criticism, 4 the most substantial deriving
from the Individuals with Disabilities Education Ace

* Mr. Mayes (J.D., 1996, University of Iowa) practices law in Waterloo, Iowa. During
the 1999-2000 academic year, Mr. Mayes was a graduate fellow in educational
leadership at Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. He is also a member of the
Iowa Commission of Persons with Disabilities. The views expressed herein are solely
those of the author.
1. 1997 Wash. Laws ch. 338, § 7, codified at Wash. Rev. Code ch. 28A.193 (2002).
2. Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.193.005 (2002).
3. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691 (Wash. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920
(2001).
4. The other claims advanced by the class concerned the right to regular and
special education under state statute, the right to regular and special education under
the Washington constitution, and rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
(29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997)).
5. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400-87 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
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(hereinafter referred to as "the IDEA"). 6 Essentially, denying
special education to incarcerated youth with disabilities, ages
eighteen to twenty-one, runs contrary to the language and
structure of the IDEA. 7 In light of the Tunstall decision, 8 this
Article considers whether the Washington statute governing
education in adult correctional facilities embodies sound law
and good public policy. 9 After examining the IDEA and its'
implementing regulations, it is apparent that the Washington
statute is in conflict with the IDEA10 and is fundamentally
misguided as a matter of public policy. 11

II. BACKGROUND
In March of 1998, the Washington legislature passed a
statute that required the Washington State Department of
Corrections to provide education to juveniles under eighteen,
incarcerated in an adult facility. 12 The statute effectively
6. See State Statute KOs Services to Incarcerated Students Ages 18-22, 16. The
Spec. Educator (Aug. 29, 2001).
7. See e.g. Loren Warboys et a!., California Juvenile Court Special Education
Manual (1994); Peter E. Leone et a!., Understanding the Overrepresentation of Youths
with Disabilities in Juvenile Detention, 3 D.C. L. Rev. 389 (1995); Kathleen Kelly, The
Education Crisis for Children in the California Juvenile Court System, 27 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 757 (2000); Thomas A. Mayes, Persons with Autism and Criminal Justice:
Core Concepts and Leading Cases, 5 J. Positive Behavior Interventions _
(forthcoming 2003); Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, The Intersections of Juvenile
Law, Criminal Law, and Special Education Law, 4 U. Cal. Davis J. Juv. L. & Policy
125 (2000); T. Rowand Robinson & Mary JaneK Rapport, Providing Special Education
in the Juvenile Justice System, 20 Remedial & Spec. Educ. 19 (1999); Dominga Soliz &
Noah Cutler, Student Authors, Disabled Youth, Incarceration, and Educational
Challenges, 5 U. Cal. Davis J. Juv. L. & Policy 265 (2001). For an article suggesting
that schools and the juvenile justice system "criminalize low student achievement," see
Augustina H. Reyes, Alternative Education: The Criminalization of Student Behavior,
29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 539, 555 (2001).
8. See infra Part II discussing Tunstall.
9. See infra Part III critiquing Tunstall.
10. See infra Part III.C. A state law or policy may not conflict with the IDEA.
See Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, State Educational Agencies and Special
Education: Obligations and Liabilities, 10 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 62, 80-82 (2000).
11. See infra Part III.D.; see also Cynthia M. Conward, Where Have All The
Children Gone?: A Look At Incarcerated Youth In America, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.
2435 (2001); Peter W. Greenwood, Responding to Juvenile Crime: Lessons Learned,
Future of Children, Winter 1996, at 75; Kelly, supra n. 7; Jo Webber, Comprehending
Youth Violence, 18 Remedial & Spec. Educ. 94 (1997).
12. Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.193.030 (2002). The statute allows the state
Superintendent of Public Instruction to adopt rules to allow eighteen-year-old students
in adult prisons to continue participation in such educational programs. Wash. Rev.
Code § 28A.193.030(4). As applied to children with disabilities, this particular
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denied educational services to inmates who had passed their
eighteenth birthday. Denying educational benefits to this
latter age group is extremely worrisome because in April 1998,
for example, roughly one thousand inmates in Washington's
adult prison system were eighteen through twenty-one. 13 Of
this age group, only one-fifth had earned a high school diploma
or general equivalency diploma. 14 A class of inmates aged
eighteen to twenty-one brought an action shortly after the
statute's passage. The trial court certified the following class:
All individuals who are now, or will in the future be,
committed to the custody of the Washington
Department of Corrections, who are allegedly denied
access to basic or special education during that custody,
and who are, during that custody under the age of 21, or
disabled and under the age of 22. 15
The case, Tunstall v. Bergeson, was tried on stipulated facts.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court
granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff class and
partial summary judgment to the State. 16 The State appealed,
and the plaintiff class cross appealed. On appeal and over ten
months after oral argument, the Supreme Court of
Washington, by a six-to-three vote, ruled in favor of the State
on almost all grounds. 17 On March 19, 2001, the United States
Supreme Court denied the class's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 18

provision runs afoul of federal law to the extent that federal law requires special
education for all children with disabilities under age twenty-two. It purports to make
optional what federal law would require.
13. Tunstall, 5 P.3d at 695.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 696; see Washington State Must Educate Juveniles in Adult Prisons,
Court Rules, Correctional Educ. Bull. 2 (no. 2) (Nov. 1998).
17. The Tunstall court reserved ruling on whether there was a constitutional
right to special education for inmates between eighteen and twenty-two "until we have
a case where the record and briefing are adequately developed." 5 P.3d at 695.
The dissent based its rationale on grounds other than the IDEA; therefore, it will
not be extensively discussed in this article. Id. at 710-13.
18. 532 U.S. 920 (2001). A denial of a certiorari petition is not considered a
decision on the merits of case, and has no precedential value. See e.g. Hopfmann u.
Connolly, 471 U.S. 459, 461 (1985).
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III. CRITIQUE OF THE TUNSTALL DECISION
Although the Tunstall case concerned multiple issues, this
critique will focus on the most disturbing facet of the court's
decision: the court's termination of education to inmates with
19
disabilities who are eighteen through twenty-one.
As this
portion of the ruling is a matter of statutory interpretation and
construction, one must first examine the relevant terms of the
IDEA to determine if Washington's statute is even
. "ble. 20
perm1ss1

A. The Core Terms of IDEA
The core terms of the IDEA, both before and after the 1997
IDEA amendments, are fairly straightforward. Each State
receiving financial assistance under the IDEA is required to
21
find and evaluate children with disabilities and provide those
children with a "free appropriate public education"
(hereinafter, "FAPE"). 22
Specifically, FAPE is specially
designed instruction and necessary related services consistent
with an Individualized Education Program (hereinafter IEP)
provided in the least restrictive environment (hereinafter
LRE). 23 As a general rule under the IDEA, FAPE is to be
provided to all children with disabilities who are ages three
through twenty-one. 24 Under certain circumstances, however, a
State may decline to provide F APE to children with disabilities
who are ages three through five and eighteen through twentyone "to the extent that [the IDEA's] application to those
children would be inconsistent with State law or practice, or
the order of any court, respecting the provision of public
19. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 28A.193 (2002).
20. For more information concerning statutory construction, see Thomas A. Mayes
& Perry A. Zirkel, Disclosure of Special Education Students' Records: Do the 1999
IDEA Regulations Mandate that Schools Comply with FERPA? 8 J.L. & Policy 455
(2000).
21. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (defining "child with a
disability").
22. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(8); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (defining "free appropriate
public education"). For the leading case on what constitutes FAPE, see Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). For information on the Rowley decision, see Perry A.
Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education From Board of Education v. Rowley: Razing
the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 Md. L. Rev. 466 (1983).
23. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 10, at 63-66 (summarizing State obligations
under the IDEA).
24. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1) (2000); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.121 (2001).
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education to children in one or more of those age groups." 25
26
The 1997 amendments to the IDEA made several
pertinent changes concerning children with disabilities in adult
correctional facilities. Initially, the amendments provided
States with additional authority to limit the provision of FAPE
to certain older children in adult prisons. 27 Specifically, 20
U.S.C. section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) allows states, by statute, to
eliminate the right to FAPE for children with disabilities, aged
eighteen through twenty-one, who "in the last educational
placement prior to their incarceration in an adult correctional
facility [were not] actually identified as being a child with a
disability [and] did not have an IEP." 28 According to the
legislative history, a child who was identified as a child with a
disability who did not have an IEP in the most recent
educational placement was not to be "excluded from services"
under this provision. 29 In addition, an identified child with a
disability who had an IEP in the last educational placement,
30
before dropping out of school, remained entitled to FAPE.
Additionally, children with disabilities who are convicted as
adults and incarcerated in adult prisons and who are entitled
to F APE are subject to additional restrictions contained in Title
31
20, United States Code, section 1414(d)(6).
First, these
children are not entitled to participate in state and district
assessments. 32 Second, transition planning for such a child is
not required if that child's IDEA entitlement will end before
33
the child's term of confinement will end.
Finally, the
34
student's IEP team may modify, on a "temporary" basis, the
student's IEP or placement if the facility demonstrates "a bona
fide security or compelling penological interest that cannot

25. 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(1) (2001); see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (2000).
26. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).
27. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
28. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.122(a)(2), 300.311(a) (2001); see also 20 U.S.C.A. §
1412(a)(1)(B)(ii).
29. H.R. Rep. No. 105-95, at 91 (1997).
30. Id.
31. See e.g. Letter to Anonymous, 30 IDELR 607 (OSEP 1998); Letter to Galaza, 30
IDELR 50 (OSEP 1997).
32. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(6)(A)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.311(b)(1) (2001).
33. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(6)(A)(ii) (2000); 34 C.F.R § 300.31l(b)(2) (2001).
34. Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, 12,577 (Mar. 12,
1999).

198

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2003

otherwise be accommodated."35 These three limitations do not
apply to children in the juvenile system or to pretrial
detainees. 36 In contrast to the provisions of Title 20 of the
United States Code, section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) discussed in
previous paragraphs, 37 which are limited to children who are
eighteen to twenty-one, section 1414(d)(6) contains no lower
age limit. The applicability of this provision depends on the
age at which state law allows juveniles to be transferred to
38
adult court.
Finally, the 1997 IDEA amendments allow states to
transfer the supervisory responsibility for providing FAPE to
"children with disabilities who are convicted as adults and
incarcerated in adult prisons" to another state agency, such as
the department of corrections or the department of public
safety. 39 If that other state agency systematically violates the
IDEA, "the United States Department of Education may only
withhold a proportion of the state's IDEA funds equal to the
proportion of children served by the other public agency, and
any withholding may only effect the other public agency.':oo~o
35. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(6)(B) (2000); 34 C.F.R. 300.311(c) (2001).
Administrative convenience or cost containment is not a sufficient interest under these
provisions. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 138-39. Any programming or placement
change under these provisions must be made by the IEP team, not the facility warden
or chief corrections officer. See Perry Zirkel & Thomas Mayes, Are Inmates with
Disabilities Entitled to Special Education?, The Spec. Educator 3 (Aug. 29, 2000) (The
State has the burden of proving the necessity of the proposed changes.).
36. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 139.
37. See supra n. 27-30 and accompanying text.
38. For information on transfer to adult court, see Kevin J. Strom, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Profile of State Prisoners under Age 18, 1985-97 (2000); Warboys, supra n. 7, at
54-56; Conward, supra n. 11, at 2440-44; Greenwood, supra n. 11, at 79; Mayes &
Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 132-33; Brent Pattison, Minority Youth in Juvenile Correctional
Facilities: Cultural Differences and the Right to Treatment, 16 L. & Ineq. J. 573, 575-76
(1998). The number of youthful defendants transferred to adult court has increased
dramatically in recent years. Strom, supra n. 37, at 3. Empirical research suggests
that transfer to adult court "has little if any deterrent effect on criminal behavior."
Janet E. Ainsworth, The Court's Effectiveness in Protecting the Rights of Juveniles in
Delinquency Cases, Future of Children 64, 69 (Winter 1996).
39. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(ll)(c) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (2001). This provision
is primarily in response to California's objection to providing special education in adult
prisons. See Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 151-52. A state must elect to transfer
supervisory authority to the other state agency. Such a transfer does not occur
automatically. To the extent that authorities imply that such a transfer occurs without
affirmative action by the state, those authorities are inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute. Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the
1997 IDEA Amendments and Federal Regulations, 28 J.L. & Educ. 543, 556 (1999).
40. Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 152 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1416(c) (2000); 34
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Under this provision, inmates with disabilities confined to
adult prisons affected by these sections remain entitled to
FAPE 41 and other enforcement mechanisms remain available. 42
B. The Tunstall Court Ruling
The Tunstall court ruled against the inmates with
disabilities on claims under both the pre-1997 IDEA and the
post-1997 IDEA. 43 The court claimed to ground its ruling on
the pre-1997 claims on the Fourth Circuit's 1997 decision in
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Education v. Riley. 44
The Riley court held that the IDEA did not require states to
provide F APE to students expelled from school for conduct
unrelated to their disability, as Congress did not explicitly
condition receipt of IDEA funds on provision of F APE to
expelled students. 45
The Tunstall court analogized the
termination of services to individuals with disabilities
incarcerated in adult prisons and the expulsion of individuals
with disabilities for conduct unrelated to their disability. 46
Regarding the post-1997 IDEA cases, the Tunstall court held,
citing Title 20, United States Code, section 1412(a)(l)(B)(1),
that providing FAPE to prison inmates with disabilities
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one would be
"inconsistent with state law;"47 consequently, it was not
required.
C.

The Tunstall Decision is Bad Law

Having previously considered the relevant text of the IDEA
in detail, 48 one should consider whether the Tunstall decision
can claim fidelity to the IDEA. 49 To the extent that it does not
C.F.R. § 300.587(e)(1999)).
41. Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed. Reg. at 12,644.
42. Id. It is important to note that this section would not authorize the complete
cessation of educational services to adult prison inmates with disabilities. Subject to
the other limitations contained in IDEA '97, these inmates remain entitled to FAPE.
However, the remedy for denial of FAPE would lie against the "other state agency," not
the SEA.
43. Tunstall, 5 P.2d at 705-06.
44. 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997).
45. Id.
46. Tunstall, 5 P.2d at 705-06.
4 7. I d. at 706.
48. See supra n. 19-42 and accompanying text.
49. See generally Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and
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conform to the boundaries of the text, it lacks legitimacy. 50 In
doing so, one may be aided by several well-settled rules of
statutory construction, the most important of which is that a
clear, unambiguous statute must be enforced as written by the
legislature. 51 To determine the clarity of a statute and, if
ambiguous, the permissible constructions of the statute, one
must read an enactment in its entirety. 52

1. The IDEA, as Amended
Starting with the post-1997 IDEA, the law now in effect, it
is clear that the State of Washington's decision to eliminate the
provision of FAPE to many inmates with disabilities is not
faithful to the terms of the IDEA Specifically, the 1997
amendments allow state law to deny FAPE only to a narrowly
defined subset of the inmate class-adult prisoners with
disabilities, ages eighteen to twenty-one, who "in the last
educational placement prior to their incarceration in an adult
correctional facility [were not] actually identified as being a
child with a disability [and] did not have an IEP."53 By limiting
the breadth of this provision's reach only to a select portion of
all inmates with disabilities, Congress clearly intended that the
remaining inmates with disabilities retain a right to FAPE. 54
Further indication that the Tunstall class retained its right
to F APE is found in the limitations that Congress allowed to be
placed on the provision of F APE to children with disabilities
confined to adult prisons after conviction as adults: limitations
on participation in "high stakes" testing, elimination of the
right to a transition plan in certain cases, and the ability to

the Law (Princeton U. Press 1997); P.obert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the
United States, in Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Summary 407-59 (D. Neil
MacCormick & RobertS. Summers eds., Dartmouth Pub. Co. 1991).
50. See e.g. U.S. Natl. Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439,
463 n.ll (1993).
51. See e.g. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997); Conn. Natl. Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992); see also Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 20, at 45859.
52. King v. St. Vincent's Hasp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991).
53. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.122(a)(2) (2001), 300.31l(a)(2) (2001); see 20 U.S.C.A. §
1412(a)(l)(B)(ii) (2000).
54. See e.g. Summers, supra n. 49, at 418. The particular rule of construction is
often stated in Latin: "expressio unius exclusio alterius (mention of one excludes
another)." Professor Summers states that this particular canon "seems to be taking on
a new life." Id. (citing Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 131-33 (1989)).
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make short-term changes in a child's IEP or placement. 55 The
fact that only these three elements of FAPE were restricted is
an unmistakable indication that the remaining rights under
the IDEA were not eroded. 56 As shown, the Washington state
statute in question sweeps broader than permissible under the
1997 IDEA amendments. 57
Instead of relying on section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) in its decision,
the Tunstall court relied on section 1412(a)(1)(B)(i), which
allows states to deny special education to children with
disabilities between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one if
providing special education to those children "would be
inconsistent with state law or practice, or the order of any
court ... "58 The Tunstall court's reliance on this section, as
well as its implementing regulations, is misplaced because it
refers to broad age groups. 59 As a general rule, it allows states
to limit special education to whole "age ranges" rather than
particular subsets of age groups. 60 Rephrased, an inconsistent
state law or court order will trump the IDEA's presumptive
entitlement for children with disabilities aged eighteen to
twenty-one only if it applies to all children within that
particular age range.
For example, a state statute could permissibly forbid the
provision of special education to all children with disabilities
after their twentieth birthdays. By contrast, a state statute
could not forbid the provision of special education in private
residential facilities for children over eighteen. Hence, under
55. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(d)(6) (2000); 34 C.F.R. 300.31l(b) (2001).
56. See e.g. Summers, supra n. 49, at 418.
57. In defending its statute, the State of Washington also relied on 20 U.S. C. §
1412(a)(l)(B)(ii). Notably, section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) would have only saved a portion of
the Washington statute. See supra n. 27-30.
58. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(l)(B)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(1)(2001).
59. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(1) (2001).
60. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2000). Two pre-IDEA '97 cases construing this
section's statutory predecessor were cited by the Tunstall court in support of its
decision. Tunstall, 5 P.3d at 706 (citing Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369
(8th Cir. 1996); Timms v. Metro. Sch. Dist., 722 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1983)). A careful
reading of both cases shows that they undermine, rather than buttress, the Tunstall
court's rationale. To varying degrees, each case stands for the proposition that the
current section 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) applies to broad age ranges, not the subset involved in
Tunstall. See Yankton Sch. Dist., 93 F.3d at 1376-77 ("An exception exists where state
law or practice does not provide for [FAPE] for students between the ages of 18 and
21."); Timms, 722 F.2d at 1313-14 (" ... unless providing [FAPE] to children aged ...
eighteen to twenty-one would be inconsistent with state law or practice or a court
order").
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he plain language of statute in question, 61 if the state provides
pecial education to some members of an age group, it must
1rovide special education to all members of that age group.
Vashington does provide special education to some students
:ged eighteen to twenty-one, 62 so it must provide special
ducation to all students aged eighteen to twenty-one. The
tatute in question in Tunstall does not concern all children
V"ithin a particular age range.
Consequently, section
412(a)(l)(B)(i) does not provide the authority for this policy
hoice as made by the State of Washington.
Even if the plain language of this statute did not refer to
1road age groups, but rather fractions of age groups, the
mplementing regulations 63 adopted by the U.S. Department of
Gducation support this interpretation.
Congress has
~mpowered the United States Department of Education to
ssue regulations to enforce the IDEA,64 and the judiciary
argely defers to the Department's interpretation and
mplementation of the statute. 65 One of the relevant IDEA
egulations states:
If State law or a court order requires the State to
provide education for children with disabilities in any
disability category in any of these age groups, the State
must make FAPE available to all children with
disabilities of the same age who have that disability. 66
Therefore, ifthe state ofWashington provides FAPE to nonrrcarcerated children with disabilities in all disability
ategories in the age groups in question, under this federal
egulation, it must provide special education to all children
rith disabilities in the subject age ranges, incarcerated or not. 67
61. An unambiguous statute is enforced according to its plain meaning. See
tpra n. 51 and accompanying text.
62. Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.155.020(2002); Wash. Admin. Code§§ 392-172-114 to
~2-172-148 (2001).
63. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.122; 300.300 (2001).
64. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1406, 1417(b) (2000). Under the "Chevron" doctrine concerning
te validity of agency regulations, a regulation, within the province of the agency to
·omulgate, will only be invalidated if it is contrary to the plain language of an
1ambiguous statute or is an unreasonable construction of an ambiguous statute. See
1evron U.S.A, Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For more
formation on the Chevron case, see Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 20, at 463-65.
65. See generally Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 20.
66. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(l) (2001).
67. For age ranges and categories of disability, see Wash. Rev. Code §
:A.155.020 (2002); Wash. Admin. Code§§ 392-172-114 to 392-172-148 (2001).
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Additionally, the IDEA regulations provide that a state is
not required to provide FAPE to children with disabilities, aged
eighteen through twenty-one, if "State law expressly prohibits,
or does not authorize, the expenditure of public funds to
68
provide education to nondisabled children in that age group."
Under Washington's Basic Education Act, students under age
twenty-one are entitled to attend public school, 69 and the State
of Washington makes adult education broadly available
through community colleges and local school districts 70 (often at
no cost), 71 including high school completion courses for students
who are twenty-one years or older. 72 The State of Washington
makes public funds available to educate persons without
disabilities in the relevant age group. Thus, there is no "State
law" prohibiting expenditures of public funds for such a
purpose. 73
Finally, the IDEA regulations state that the provision of
FAPE to children with disabilities between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one is not required if that "requirement is
inconsistent with a court order that governs the provision of
free appropriate public education to children with disabilities
in that State.'m In Tunstall, there was no particular court
order75 governing special education that would be inconsistent
with providing F APE to the inmates with disabilities, in the

68. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(5)(i) (2001).
69. Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.150.220(3) (2002).
70. Wash. Rev. Code § 28B.50.030(12) (defining "adult education"); Wash. Rev.
Code . § 28B.50.250 (allowing local school districts to offer adult education if not in
conflict with programs offered by local community college); Wash. Admin. Code§§ 18072-040 to 180-72-070 (2001) (implementing regulations).
71. Wash. Admin. Code § 131-28-026(4)(a) (2001) ("no charge" for "adult basic
education" at community and technical colleges).
72. Wash. Rev. Code § 28B.50.030(12) (2002); Wash. Admin. Code § 180-72-050
(2001).
73. The Tunstall majority excluded inmates, over age eighteen, in adult
correctional facilities from the scope of the Basic Education Law's guarantee of
education up to the twenty-first birthday. Tunstall, 5 P.3d at 696-98. For purposes of
34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(5)(i) (2001), however, this is irrelevant. Under that rule, State
law may eliminate the right to FAPE for children with disabilities in the relevant age
ranges only if the State does not provide public funds for the education of any student
without a disability in the age ranges in question. Washington cannot make such a
claim, and cannot avail itself of§ 300.300(b)(5)(i).
74. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(5)(ii) (2001).
75. There is no court order or decree similar to the now-familiar decrees in Pa.
Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commw., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), or Mills v.
Bd. o{Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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subject class. Rather, there is only a judicial opinion rejecting
challenges that a statute is impermissible under the IDEA. If
"court order" were interpreted in such a manner, it would be an
invitation to lawlessness. Should that interpretation prevail,
no IDEA requirement would be secure for children with
disabilities in the subject age groups. The state could pass a
statute eliminating any IDEA right for children in the subject
age group, and a reviewing court could cloak the offensive
statute in the garb of a "court order."
There is an additional canon of statutory interpretation and
construction
that
undermines
the
Tunstall
court's
interpretation of the IDEA, as amended.
If section
1412(a)(2)(B)(i) and its implementing regulations had the
meaning ascribed to them by the Tunstall court, then the
amendment adding section 1412(a)(2)(B)(ii) would have been
superfluous. Section 1412(a)(2)(B)(i) is identical to language
from the pre-1997 IDEA. 76
If that section provided the
authority for States to cease providing special education to all
children with disabilities in adult prisons after their eighteenth
birthdays, then why did Congress add section 1412(a)(2)(B)(ii)
giving the States a much more limited right to deny FAPE to a
less expansive group of inmates with disabilities?
It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation and
construction that each provision of a statute "must, if possible,
be construed in such a fashion that every word has some
operative effect."77 Furthermore, Congressional amendments
are presumed "to have real and substantial effect."78 Hence,
section 1412(a)(2)(B)(ii) must have some practical significance.
By enacting that section, Congress provided the strongest
possible evidence that section 1412(a)(2)(B)(i) provided no
authority to Washington to eliminate the provision of FAPE to
inmates with disabilities in adult prisons who are eighteen
years old or older.
The Tunstall court's decision is further eroded by the

76. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(2)(B) (1994).
77. U.S. v. Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992); accord Mt. St. Tel. & Tel. v.
Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392
(1979).
78. Stone v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995); accord
Sutton v. U.S., 819 F.3d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1987); Model Statutory Construction Act §
13(2), 14 U.L.A. 389, 401 (1990) ("In enacting a statute it is presumed that (2) the
entire statute is intended to be effective.").
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prominent position adult correctional facilities have m the
IDEA and in the implementing regulations.
First,
representatives of adult correctional facilities are required
members on each State's special education advisory board. 79
Second, the IDEA applies to, and the State is responsible for,
supervising "all educational programs for children with
disabilities in the State, including all such programs
administered by any other State or local agency."80 This
includes adult correctional facilities, 81 a point explicitly stated
in the IDEA regulations. 82
Under the IDEA, as amended in 1997, a state may not deny
FAPE to all children with disabilities, aged eighteen through
twenty-one, incarcerated in adult prisons. 83 On this point, the
Tunstall court erred and the decision should not be followed in
other jurisdictions.

2. Pre-1997 IDEA.
To the extent this inquiry is relevant, 84 the pre-1997 IDEA
does not sanction the State of Washington's statute any more
than does the post-1997 IDEA First, the IDEA provision
relied on by the Tunstall court, 85 section 1412(a)(2)(B)(i),
existed in identical form prior to the 1997 Amendments. 86 As
noted above, this statute does not allow for the suspension of
special education for children with disabilities, as in the
Tunstall class. 87
The Tunstall court's reliance on the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Commonwealth v. Rilel8 is also misplaced. The
Riley court held that students with disabilities "expelled or
suspended long-term due to serious misconduct wholly
unrelated to their disabilities [are not entitled to] continued

79. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(21)(B)(x) (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.651(a)(10) (2001).
80. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(ll)(A)(ii) (2000).
81. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(ll)(C) (2000).
82. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(1)(iv) (2001).
83. See supra n. 53-82 and accompanying text.
84. The IDEA amendments were effective before the Washington statute was
effective. Compare Pub. L. 105-17, § 201(a)(l) (relevant portions of IDEA-'97 effective
on June 4, 1997) with Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.193.900 (effective date Mar. 30, 1998).
85. Tunstall, 5 P.2d at 706.
86. ld. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1994)).
87. See supra n. 58-78 and accompanying text.
88. 106 F.3d 559.
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provision of educational services."89 The Riley court reasoned
that Congress had not expressly conditioned receipt of IDEA
funds on the provision ofFAPE to children expelled for conduct
90
not related to their disabilities.
This rationale does not support the Tunstall decision for
two fundamental reasons. First, the Riley decision focuses on
cessation of educational services to children expelled from
school for conduct not related to their disabilities. 91 The
Washington statute at issue makes no such distinction.
Instead, it ends all special education services to all
incarcerated children with disabilities at age eighteen, whether
or not the particular child was incarcerated for conduct related
to her disability. 92 Plainly stated, the Tunstall court relies on
authority that does not support the proposition for which it is
cited.
Second, whereas the Riley court found that the IDEA did
not require continuation of FAPE for children expelled for
conduct not related to a disability, the pre-1997 IDEA clearly
required provision of special education to all children with
disabilities through their twenty-second birthday, whether or
not incarcerated, 93 and any then-existing exception to this
obligation does not permit States to end special education
services to the Tunstall class members with disabilities. 94 The
Tunstall decision, for these two reasons, is distinguishable
from Riley.
In addition, assuming that the Riley decision provides
support for the statute at issue, subsequent congressional
action calls into question the correctness of the Riley decision.
Specifically, in 1997, Congress amended the IDEA to state that
even children with disabilities who are expelled for conduct not
89. I d. at 561. For more discussion of the aftermath of the Riley decision and the
1997 IDEA amendments, see Theresa J. Bryant, The Death Knell for School Expulsion:
The 1997 IDEA Amendments to the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 47
Am. U. L. Rev. 487 (1998).
90. Riley, 106 F.3d at 561.
91. Id.
92. For discussions of the often confusing relationship between special education
law and criminal law, see e.g. Warboys, supra n. 7; Leone, supra n. 7; Mayes & Zirkel,
supra n. 7; Robinson & Rapport, supra n. 7.
93. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (1994); see also Letter to Teagarden, 29 IDELR 973,
974 (OSEP 1997) (citing Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 800-801 (D.S.C. 1995);
Donnell C. v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Green v.
Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965, 976 (D. Mass. 1981)).
94. See supra n. 58-78 and accompanying text.
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related to their disabilities are entitled to FAPE. 95 Although
ordinarily a congressional amendment is presumed to indicate
a change in the law, 96 that is not always the case. For example,
a division of authorities addressing a question resolved by the
amendment may indicate that the "subsequent amendment is
intended to clarify, rather than change, the existing law."97
Regarding cessation of special education to children with
disabilities expelled for conduct not related to their disability,
the Riley decision is contrary to prior decisions from the Sixth
Circuie8 and Fifth Circuit. 99 The Seventh Circuit100 and
arguably the Ninth Circuie 01 are both in accord with Riley.
Stepping in to resolve this circuit split, Congress stated that its
amendment requiring continuation of services to expelled
students was a "clarification[] of current law."102 In light of
these clear statements of an intention to codify existing law,
rather than create new law, the potency of the Riley precedent
is significantly diluted.
B. The Statute at Issue in Tunstall Represents Bad Policy
Not only is the Supreme Court of Washington's decision in
95. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1) (2000), 1415(k)(5)(A) (2000); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.121(d)
(2001), 300.524(a) (2001). For more information on the IDEA's provisions concerning
the discipline of children with disabilities, see e.g. Cynthia A. Dieterich & Christine J.
Villani, Functional Behavior Assessment: Process without Procedure, 2000 B.Y.U. Educ.
& L.J. 209; Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, and the
Disabled Student, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Allen G. Osborne, Discipline of SpecialEducation Students Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 29
Fordham Urb. L.J. 513 (2001); Terry Jean Seligmann, Not as Simple as ABC:
Disciplining Children with Disabilities Under the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 42 Ariz. L.
Rev. 77 (2000); Carl R. Smith, Behavioral and Discipline Provision of the IDEA '97:
Implicit Competencies Yet to Be Confirmed, 66 Exceptional Children 403 (2000); Perry
A. Zirkel, The IDEA's Suspension/Expulsion Requirements: A Practical Picture, 134
Educ. L. Rep. 19 (West 1999).
96. See supra n. 58-78 and accompanying text.
97. In re Fielder, 799 F.2d 656, 660-661 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing In re Adams, 761
F.2d 1422, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing cases)). Although such arguments are not
favored, see C. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185-86 (1994) ("they should
not be rejected out of hand as a source that a court may consider in the search for
legislative intent."); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n. 8 (1980).
98. Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1982).
99. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1981), disapproved on other
grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988).
100. Doe v. Bd. ofEduc., 115 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 1997).
101. Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986), affd on other grounds sub.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 316 (1988).
102. H.R. Rep. 105-95, 90 (1997); Sen. Rep. 105-17, 11 (1997).
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Tunstall not legally supportable, 103 it is also bad public policy.
This discussion of public policy is necessary because other
States may be emboldened to adopt similar legislation by the
United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
Tunstall. 104 This is particularly important because several
states, in addition to Washington and California, have been
historically reluctant to offer special education in adult
correctional facilities. 105
Due to the inordinately high number of persons with
disabilities in the criminal justice system, 106 close attention
must be paid to any policy choice concerning the conditions of
confinement of children and young adults in America. 107
Common goals, often concurrent and contradictory, of juvenile
and adult corrections systems include rehabilitation and
prevention, punishment and retribution, and deterrence. 108
Many responses to crime and delinquency may not be effective;
in fact, some, such as "Scared Straight" shock-tactic programs,
may "do more harm than good."109 Given the fact that a poor
education places a person at a high risk of incarceration110 and
that incarcerating an individual is very costly, 111 states and
local governments, if acting rationally, should pursue policies
that will reduce the likelihood that inmates will re-offend upon
103. See supra Part III. C. stating that Tunstall is "bad law".
104. 532 u.s. 920 (2001).
105. Rita Kirshstein & Clayton Best, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Survey of State
Correctional Educational Systems: Analysis of Data from 1992 Field Test 3 (1996) (only
33 of 42 responding states offer special education in adult prisons).
106. See Green v. Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965, 968 (D. Mass. 1981); Warboys, supra
n. 7, at 30-37; Conward, supra n. 11, at 2448-50; Kelly, supra n. 7, at 761-65; Leone,
supra n. 7; Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 126; Robinson & Rapport, supra n. 7, at 1921; Soliz & Cuttler, supra n. 7, at 267; Better Services Could Reduce Need For Juvenile
Justice, Sch. Violence Alert (Mar. 6, 2001). According to limited data, at least one
percent of adult inmates with disabilities receive special education services. Kirshstein
& Best, supra n. 105, at 5. Kirschstein and Best's data is limited by a low response
rate to this particular question on their survey instrument (19 of 50 states) and by the
fact that their data does not distinguish between inmates who are eligible, age-wise, for
IDEA and inmates who have aged out ofiDEA eligibility.
107. See Greenwood, supra n. 11, at 83.
108. Id. at 78; see also Pattison, supra n. 28; Ira M. Schwartz, Delinquency
Prevention: Where's the Beef?, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 132 (1991).
109. Greenwood, supra n. 11, at 83; Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 156-57.
110. See e.g. Conward, supra n. 11, at 2447; Kelly, supra n. 7, at 760; Stanley A.
Karcz et al., Abrupt Transitions for Youths Leaving School: Models of Interagency
Cooperation, 1 Techniques 497, 497 (1985); Webber, supra n. 11, at 97.
111. See e.g., Kelly, supra n. 7, at 758 ($37,000 per year to incarcerate an
individual in the California Youth Authority).
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release. The literature makes clear that education, including
special education, is a key part of an overall strategy to reduce
criminal behavior by children and young adults. 112 Ignoring the
educational needs of all incarcerated children, 113 especially
those with disabilities, is "morally and fiscally untenable."114
There is every indication that providing education to
incarcerated individuals with disabilities will reduce the
likelihood that they will again become involved in the criminal
justice system. 115 Any short-term savings justifying the statute
at issue in Tunstall 116 will likely be overwhelmed by the
benefits foregone by not providing FAPE to children with
disabilities over eighteen who are confined to adult prisons. 117
The enactment of Washington Revised Code chapter 28A.193 in
1998 is thus a departure from sound public policy. The State of
Washington would be well-advised to reconsider this statute,
and her sister states are advised not to follow her lead.

112. See e.g. Mayes & Zirkel, supra n. 7, at 156 (citing studies); see also Warboys,
supra n. 7, at 64-66; Conward, supra n. 11, at 1258-59; Greenwood, supra n. 11, at 83;
Karcz, supra n. 110, at 497-99; Kelly, supra n. 7, at 770-73; Howard N. Snyder, The
Juvenile Court and Deliquency Cases, Future of Children 53, 61 (Winter 1996);
Schwartz, supra n. 111, at 138; Better Services. .. , supra n. 106.
113. The educational needs of minority students with disabilities in the adult
criminal justice system are an additional area of concern to policy makers and
practitioners. Given the overrepresentation of persons of color in the criminal justice
system (see Pattison, supra n. 38; see also Conward, supra n. 11, at 2453-55; Snyder,
supra n. 112, at 59-60) and in special education (see e.g. Theresa Glennon, Race,
Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wise. L. Rev. 1237; Robert
Pressman, A Comprehensive Approach to the Disparate Special Education Placement
Rates of African-American and National-Origin Minority Youth, 27 Clearinghouse Rev.
323 (1993); Dalun Zhang & Antonis Katsiyannis, Minority Representation in Special
Education: A Persistent Challenge, 23 Remedial & Spec. Educ. 180 (2002)), any
approach to end special education in adult correctional facilities must be considered
carefully from a racial justice standpoint.
114. Kelly, supra n. 7, at 757.
115. See e.g. Karcz, supra n. 110, at 497.
116. In Washington, it costs approximately $10,000 per student per year to provide
special education in adult prisons. Washington State Must ... , supra n. 16.
117. The cost differential between more punitive policies and more
therapeutidrehabilitative policies are often stunning. Professor Conward notes that
one million dollars spent on early intervention would "prevent as many as 250 crimes."
Conward, supra n. 11, at 2455 (citing Sandy Wilber, Can Prevention Programs Stem
the Tide of Delinquency?: Are We Penny-Wise and Pound Foolish?, Juv. Just.
<http://www.juvenilejustice.com>). A similar amount of money spent on incarceration
would only prevent 60 crimes. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The State of Washington, in passing a statute ending
special education for many persons with disabilities in adult
prisons, made a poor policy choice. In Tunstall v. Bergeson, the
Supreme Court of Washington erroneously rejected challenges
to that statute based on the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. Notwithstanding the denial of certiorari in
Tunstall by the Supreme Court of the United States, other
states should steer clear of the course plotted by the State of
Washington.

